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52 Britain
The Economist
September 22nd 2018
2
one day and not the next.”
Tighter controls on low-skilled mi-
grants are the flip side of the
MAC
’s propos-
al. It recommends ending nearly all such
immigration, arguing that low-skilled jobs
could be done by Britons or by migrants
who come for the purpose of family re-
union. (A seasonal workers’ scheme could
bail out agriculture, it suggests.)
Some industries predictably squealed
at this. The Freight Transport Association,
whose members employ migrants as driv-
ers, warned that “next-day deliveries
would soon be a thing of the past.” Yet
such companies might be forced to invest
more in labour-saving technologies, en-
hancing their workers’ productivity. And
having large numbers of businesses en-
gaged in low-wage, low-productivity activ-
ities may not represent the best use of Brit-
ain’s capital. Industries that have benefited
from low-skilled migration are “not neces-
sarily the parts of the
UK
economy that we
want to be growing,” notedAlanManning,
the
MAC
’s chairman.
The idea of treating
EU
and non-
EU
mi-
grants equally seems to alignwith the gov-
ernment’s thinking. Sajid Javid, the home
secretary, has indicated that he would like
to harmonise
EU
and non-
EU
migration
after Brexit. Theresa May, the prime minis-
ter, has said she would like “a set of rules
for people from the European Union and
people fromoutside the EuropeanUnion.”
The Labour Party also backed the
MAC
’s
proposals, calling for an “end to discrimi-
nation” against non-
EU
migrants.
Yet as the
MAC
itself repeatedly empha-
sises, its economic analysis takes no ac-
count of the political considerations that
surround immigration. The most obvious
concerns the Brexit negotiations. The
EU
would prefer to maintain the free move-
ment of people between it and Britain,
since its citizens are the clearest beneficia-
ries of the current system. In return forpref-
erential access, it might bewilling to offer a
better trade deal, as well as the reciprocal
right for unskilled or retired Britons to live
andwork in the
EU
.
The same principle applies to other
countries with which Britain hopes to
strike trade deals after Brexit. India has
made clear that it wants freer migration to
be a component of any trade agreement.
Last year the thenAustralian high commis-
sioner suggested that he expected “greater
access for Australian businesspeople” as
part of the price of a deal.
Mrs May could stick to her guns and in-
sist that immigration policy must be strict-
ly nationality-neutral. In isolation, that
might lead to “modest” improvements
over the current set-up, as the
MAC
argues.
Yet it would greatly limit the scope of fu-
ture trade agreements, not just with the
EU
but far beyond. Not for the first time, Brit-
ain must reckon with the fact that taking
back control comes at a cost.
7
Migration in Europe
How to bend the rules
T
HERESAMAY’S government has long
insisted that freemovement of people
from the EuropeanUnion to Britainmust
end after Brexit. Commentary on this
week’sMigration AdvisoryCommittee
(
MAC
) report has focused on its advice
that Britain should not offer
EU
citizens
preferential terms after it leaves. Yet the
report pointedly adds that “preferential
access to the
UK
labourmarket would be
of benefit to
EU
citizens”. This clearly
hints that a regime favouring
EU
migrants
could be a bargaining chip towin better
access to the
EU
’s singlemarket.
The principle of getting free trade in
return for freemovement is implicit in
the singlemarket’s rules. As amatter of
economics, a singlemarket could be built
around the freemovement of goods,
services and capital. But the
EU
deliber-
ately adds freemovement of people,
whichmost citizens outside Britain see as
a benefit of the club.
Yet it also permits exceptions. Harvey
Redgrave of the Tony Blair Institute, a
think-tank, notes that other
EU
countries
have long been amazed that, given Brit-
ain’s hostility to
EU
migration, its govern-
ment has never applied the constraints
allowed on freemovement. It was one of
only three countries not to limit the
migration of nationals fromcentral and
eastern European countries for the first
fewyears after they joined the
EU
in
2004. Even today it ismore generous than
it need be. In June Britain chose not to
extend limits on freemovement from
Croatia, which joined the
EU
in 2013, for
twomore years.
Britain is also in aminority in having
no registration system for
EU
migrants.
Post-Brexit, it could use such a system, as
Belgiumdoes, to throwout migrants who
have no job after sixmonths. Denmark
and Austria limit migrants’ ability to buy
homes in some places.
Most
EU
countries are also tougher
than Britain in insisting that welfare
benefits cannot be claimed until ami-
grant builds up some years’ worth of
contributions. Equally, the
EU
’s posted-
workers directive is used bymany to try
to stop any undercutting of local labour
markets. But Britain is lax in enforcing
both itsminimumwage and its standards
forworking conditions.
Non-
EU
countries in the European
Economic Area have other options. Liech-
tenstein, a tiny principality, has quotas on
EU
migrants, despite being a full member
of the singlemarket. Article 112 of the
EEA
treaty allows Iceland andNorway to
invoke an “emergency brake”, although
they have never used it. And non-
EEA
Switzerland, which is in the singlemarket
for goods, not only limits property pur-
chases but alsomakesmost employers
offer jobs to Swiss nationals first.
This particular concessionwas se-
cured after the
EU
refused to accept a
Swiss vote in 2014 to set limits on free
movement. Yet a further referendumon
the issue is now threatened, so Brussels
may have to bend its rules yet again. All
this comes as other
EU
countries besides
Britain are looking for newways to con-
strain the freemovement of people.
The
MAC
report itself points to the
irony that all this is happening as
EU
migration to Britain is going down fast. It
notes that the countrymay be ending free
movement just as public concern about it
is falling. It is not too late for a compro-
mise inwhich Britain accepts something
like freemovement in principle, but
heavily constrains it in practice.
ManyEuropean countries interpret freemovementmore loosely thanBritain