58 International
The Economist
May 5th 2018
2
become more needy. But a recent
IMF
re-
port argues the greatest boost to recruiting
and keeping women in paid jobs comes
from public spending on early-years edu-
cation and child care.
Employers can do more too, most obvi-
ously by providing flexible working condi-
tions, such as the ability to work remotely
or at unconventional hours, and to take ca-
reer breaks. Fathers need to be able to en-
joy the same flexible working options as
mothers. Some women are kept out of the
workforce by discrimination. This can be
overt. According to the World Bank, 104
countries still ban women from some pro-
fessions. Russian women, for example,
cannot be ship’s helmsmen (in order, ap-
parently, to protect their reproductive
health). More often discrimination is co-
vert or the unintended consequence of un-
conscious biases.
Countries can also tap older workers.
Ben Franklin, of
ILC UK
, a think-tank, ar-
gues that 65, a common retirement age, is
an arbitrary point at which to cut off a
working life. And in many countries even
gettingworkers to stickarounduntil then is
proving difficult. Today Chinese workers
typically retire between 50 and 60; but by
2050 about 35% of the population are ex-
pected to be over 60. Thanks to generous
early-retirement policies, only 41% of Euro-
peans aged between 60 and 64 are in paid
work. Among 65- to 74-year-olds the pro-
portion is lower than 10%. In Croatia, Hun-
gary and Slovakia it is belowone in 20.
The levers for governments to pull are
well known: they can remove financial in-
centives (tax or benefits) to retire early and
increase those to keepworking. Raising the
state retirement age is a prerequisite almost
everywhere; if the average retirement age
were increased by 2-2.5 years per decade
between 2010 and 2050, this would be
enough to offset demographic changes
faced by “old” countries such as Germany
and Japan, found Andrew Mason of the
University of Hawaii and Ronald Lee of
the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley.
Employers, too, will have to change
their attitudes to older workers. Especially
in Japan and Korea, where they are most
needed, workers are typically pushed out
when they hit 60 (life expectancy is 84 and
82 respectively). Extending working lives
will require investment in continued train-
ing, flexible working arrangements, such
as phased retirement, and improvedwork-
ing conditions, particularly for physically
tough jobs. In 2007
BMW
, a German car-
maker, facing an imminent outflow of ex-
periencedworkers, set up an experimental
older-workers’ assembly line. Ergonomic
tweaks, such as lining floors with wood,
better footwear and rotating workers be-
tween jobs, boosted productivity by 7%,
equalling that of younger workers. Absen-
teeism fell below the factory’s average.
Several of these adjustments turned out to
benefit all employees and are nowapplied
throughout the company.
A final option is to lure more migrants
in their prime years. Working-age popula-
tions are expected to keep growing for de-
cades in countries such as Australia, Cana-
da and New Zealand, which openly court
qualifiedmigrants. Others can try to entice
foreign students and hope they stick
around. Arturas Zukauskas, the rector of
Vilnius University, thinks that he could im-
prove greatly on the current tally of foreign
students—just 700 out of19,200. In particu-
lar, he looks to Israel, which has the highest
birth rate in the richworld. Lithuania had a
large Jewish population before the second
world war, and many prominent Israelis
have roots in the country. Partly to signal
the academy’s openness, Vilnius Universi-
ty has started awarding “memory diplo-
mas”, mostly posthumously, to some Jew-
ish students evicted onNazi orders.
The trouble is that the countries with
the biggest demographic shortfalls are of-
ten the most opposed to immigration. For
example, the inhabitants of the Czech Re-
public and Hungary view immigrants
more negatively than any other Europeans
do, according to the European Social Sur-
vey. Those countries’ working-age popula-
tions are expected to shrink by 4% and 5%
respectively between 2015 and 2020.
Countries that lacka recent historyofmass
immigration may have few supporters for
opening the doors wider. Even if they
wanted new settlers, they might have to
look for them far afield. Countries with
shrinking working-age populations are of-
ten surrounded by others that face the
same problem.
“China has never been a country of im-
migrants,” explains Fei Wang of Renmin
University in Beijing. It is unlikely to be-
come one, but is trying to lure back emi-
grants and to attract members of the eth-
nic-Chinese diaspora. In February the
government relaxed visa laws for “foreign-
ers of Chinese origin”. In Shanghai, and
perhaps soon in other cities, foreign-pass-
port holders are allowed to import maids
from countries such as the Philippines.
That is a small step in the right direction.
Just as countries’ demographic chal-
lenges vary in scale, so the remedies will
help more in some countries than in oth-
ers. Take Italy and Germany. Both have
shrinking working-age populations that
are likely to go on shrinking roughly in par-
allel. But Italy could do far more to help it-
self. Because the women’s employment
rate in Italy lags so far behind the men’s
rate, its active population would jump if
that gap closed quickly—and if everybody
worked longer andbecamemore educated
(see chart 2). Germany coulddo less tohelp
itself, and Lithuania less still.
In theory, every rich country can prise
open the demographic trap. Governments
could begin by lowering barriers to immi-
grants and raising the retirement age. They
could entice more women into the work-
force. They could raise the birth rate bypro-
viding subsidised child care, which would
create a wave of new workers in a couple
ofdecades, justwhen the other reforms are
peteringout. But,whena country is shrink-
ing, many things come to seem more diffi-
cult. Earlier this year, Poland built up a
large backlog of immigration applications,
many of them from Ukrainians. It turned
out that the employment offices were bad-
ly understaffed, and could not process the
paperwork in time. They had tried to take
onworkers, but failed.
7
1
Sloping off
Source: United Nations Population Division *Aged 15-64
Working-age population*,
(peak year=100)
75
80
85
90
95
100
10 5
Peak
5 10 15 20 25
France
(2010)
Russia
(2010)
China
(2015)
Germany
(1995)
Japan
(1995)
Lithuania
(1990)
Thailand
(2020)
Years before/after peak
2
The Italian jobs
Source: T. Van Rie,
J. Peschner, B. Kromen
*Assumes activity rates by sex, age and education remain constant
†
Assumes female activity rate
reaches male rate by 2030; strong rise in age 55-64 activity rate; rapid educational progress
Working-age population, m
Italy
Germany
Lithuania
Working-age population (aged 20-64)
Active population
Low scenario*
High scenario
†
0
10
20
30
40
50
2000 10 20 30 40
FORECAST
0
10
20
30
40
50
2000 10 20 30 40
FORECAST
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
2000 10 20 30 40
FORECAST
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