Econ_Sep_22

12 Leaders

The Economist

September 22nd 2018

givenChina’smuscle-flexing. Yet the amendmentwill bemore

controversial than it sounds, since it strikesmany Japanese as a

signal of an uncomfortably assertive foreign policy. Mr Abe

might easily end up devoting his final years in office to secur-

ing its approval, first from the Diet and then fromvoters.

Thatwould be amistake. Mr Abemay be burning to give Ja-

pan a more normal foreign policy, but what it needs most is a

more normal economy. His signature policy—Abenomics—is

far fromcomplete. The fiscal andmonetary expansion, his first

two “arrows”, were supposed to buy time for the third and

most important one: sweeping structural reforms, leading to

enduring growth. Mr Abe has taken some steps, most notably

by agreeing to expose coddled industries to foreign competi-

tion via the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation trade deal

that America abandoned andwhichMr Abe pursuedwithout

it. He has pledged todomore, such as raising the retirement age

and getting some pensioners to paymore for health care.

MrAbemust honour that pledge, and then gomuch further.

In many areas, his reforms are too timid. To keep women in

work—a must given Japan’s shrinking population—he has

done little more than increase the number of nursery places,

andnot byenough. He has not even tried topersuade ordinary

Japanese of the benefits of immigration. Granted, he has quiet-

ly admitted more guest-workers, but they are not able to stay

long even if they learn Japanese. The labour market, mean-

while, remains unduly rigid. Workers are hard to dismiss and

tax rules discouragemarriedwomen fromworking full-time.

In short, like the Japaneseworkforce, Mr Abe’s government

is ageing and, although skilled, insufficiently productive. He

should put his political strength to better use. The economy

should take precedence over constitutional reform—not least

because that extra wealth would do more to help Japan stand

up to China. Otherwise, Mr Abe will be remembered less for

his long tenure than forwasting it.

HE 21st century, in one way

at least, will be African. In

1990 sub-Saharan Africa ac-

counted for 16% of the world’s

births. Because African birth

rates are so much higher than

elsewhere, the proportion has

risen to 27% and is expected to

hit 37% in 2050. About a decade later, more babieswill be born

in sub-Saharan Africa than in the whole of Asia, including In-

dia and China. These projections by the

, if correct, are as-

tounding (see Middle East and Africa section). There is good

reason for theworld toworry about Africa’s baby boom.

The danger is not a Malthusian crisis, in which countries

runout offoodor farmlandat some point in the future. It is true

that Africa, although vast, is already a net food importer. But

that would be fine ifAfricanswere otherwise productive.

The real problem is that too many babies sap economic de-

velopment andmake it harder to lift Africans out ofpoverty. In

the world as a whole, the dependency ratio—the share of peo-

ple under the age of 20 or older than 64, who are provided for

by working-age people—stands at 74: 100. In sub-Saharan Afri-

ca it is a staggering129: 100.

In stark contrast with most of the world, notably Asia, the

number of extremely poor Africans is rising, in part because

the highest birth rates are in the poorest parts of the continent.

On September 19th the World Bank reported that the number

of people living in extreme poverty rose in sub-Saharan Africa

between 2013 and 2015, from 405m to 413m (see Finance sec-

tion). ManyAfrican countries already struggle to build enough

schools andmedical clinics for their existing children, let alone

themasses to come.

The experience of other countries where birth rates have

fallen sharply is that the number ofbabies is determinedmore

by parents’ wishes than by anything else. As people move

fromvillages to cities, children becomemore costly, so couples

want fewer of them. As they become wealthier, they have less

fear that their children will die. So, on the face of it, economic

and social forces should be left to do their work. Moreover, an

odd chorus of leftists (whohate racismandWesternmeddling)

and Christian conservatives (who hate abortion and some

kinds of contraception) argue that nothing should be done.

The trouble is that the reduction in fertility—the number of

births per woman—is happening much more slowly in Africa

than elsewhere. Half of Nigerians already live in cities, com-

pared with one-third of Indians. Yet Nigeria’s fertility rate is

more than double India’s. Overall, the fertility rate in sub-Sa-

haran Africa is dropping about half as quickly as it did in Asia

or Latin Americawhen familieswere the same size.

Fourmouths good, twomouths better

African countries need not, and should not, go down the coer-

cive route to smaller families once taken by India, which car-

ried out mass-sterilisation campaigns, or China, which long

enforced a one-child policy. This led to, among other horrors,

large-scale sex-selective abortions.

Instead there are good examples fromwithinAfrica of how

to make things better. These involve “small is beautiful” pub-

lic-information campaigns combined with a government

drive to get varied birth control to poor rural areas. Many Afri-

can governments already have fine-sounding policies to pro-

mote contraceptive use, yet too few act on them. Where such

policies are a priority, as in Ethiopia, Malawi and Rwanda, fer-

tility rates fall faster than average (though they are still high).

Just as many Africans leapfrogged from no phones to mobile

phones, and from no power to solar power, so they can jump

to innovations like self-injected contraceptives.

High fertility can also be tackled indirectly, by concentrat-

ing on the things that are known to affect it—above all, educa-

tion for girls. Granted, many African schools are awful, with

ill-educated teachers who rarely turn up. One way to change

that is to encourage private providers, as Liberia has done. Bet-

ter schools would bring many other benefits to African chil-

dren—the living aswell as the yet-to-be conceived.

Demography

Not so fast

Population

Medium projection, bn

1950 2000 50 2100

Sub-Saharan Africa

Rest of world

F’CAST

African countries canbring down theirbirth rateswithout resorting toAsian-style illiberalism