The Economist
September 22nd 2018
Leaders 11
1
2
without wastingmoney or lapsing into protectionism? The
EU
has a dismal record in high-tech industrial policy. Witness
Quaero, a failed attempt to build a European alternative to
Google, or the Human Brain Project, which has spent over
€1bn ($1.17bn) with little to show for it. Experts warn against
the rise of “
AI
nationalism”, whereby countries increasingly
try to keep their data and their algorithms to themselves.
Two aims should guide
EU
policy. Instead of focusing its fi-
nancing on high-profile individual projects, Europe should
create the environment for its
AI
industry to thrive. And in-
stead of keeping foreign providers out, it should use its clout to
improve their behaviour.
Creating the right environment means, above all, working
to overcome the fragmentation that bedevils Europe. Big and
homogeneous home markets give America and China the
huge advantage of scale. According to one estimate, Chinawill
hold 30% of theworld’s data by 2030; America is likely to have
just as much. Europe has data, too, but needs to pool its re-
sources. To its credit, the EuropeanCommission is arguing for a
common market for data. But much more needs to be done,
such as laying down rules about howdata held by companies
and governments can be shared.
National faultlines also cut deep in research and develop-
ment. Germany has downgraded plans to co-operate with
France in
AI
research, for example. In addition, Europe’s exist-
ing research bureaucracy is adept at sucking up funds, to the
detriment of startups and outsiders. Better to encourage grass-
roots initiatives such as
CLAIRE
and
ELLIS
, which seek to create
Europe-wide networks of research labs. France has launched
JEDI
, short for Joint European Disruptive Initiative, an attempt
to mimic America’s Defence Advanced Research Projects
Agency (
DARPA
), which allocates money using open competi-
tions and does not hesitate to cull programmes that fail to
showpromise. More opportunities of this sort, plus an accom-
modating immigration regime, would attract and retain
AI
re-
searchers, who often decamp to America (and sometimes
even to China).
European policymakers can alsomake better use of the one
area where they are world-class—setting standards. Europe’s
market of 500m relatively wealthy consumers is still enticing
enough that firms will generally comply with
EU
rules rather
than pull out. An example is a strict newprivacy law, the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation; the principles of the
GDPR
are
nowbeing used as a benchmark for good data practice inmar-
kets well beyond Europe. By imposing common rules, such
standards can help the
EU
’s indigenous
AI
industry flourish.
But they could also have a more subtle effect—of making
AI
fromoutside the
EU
more benign.
By the rule book
America and China both represent flawed models of data col-
lection and governance. China sees
AI
as a powerful tool to
monitor, manage and control its citizens. America’s tech titans
scoop up users’ data with insufficient regard for their privacy.
The
GDPR
is just the start. Robust standards are needed to en-
sure that
AI
services are transparent and fair and that they do
not discriminate against particular groups. Europe has a
chance to shape the development of
AI
so that this vital tech-
nology takesmore goals into account than simplymaximising
advertising income and minimising dissent. Even if it comes
up with policies that help its native
AI
industry thrive, Europe
may never match America and China. But it can nonetheless
help guide
AI
onto a path that benefits its own citizens, and
those in the rest of theworld.
7
J
APANESE prime ministers
used to come and go in the
blinkofan eye, but ShinzoAbe
has been inoffice for longer than
the previous five combined.
This week he easily won a third
consecutive term as head of the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(see Asia section). Given the
LDP
’s landslide victory in last
year’s parliamentary election, Mr Abe is now secure in office
until 2021.
Ifhe completes his newterm, hewould be the longest-serv-
ing prime minister since the job was created, in 1885. Under
him, the
LDP
has convincinglywon three elections for the low-
er house and two for the upper house. With his coalition part-
ners, he commands more than two-thirds of the Diet. Perhaps
most impressively, he has quelled the factionalismthat used to
plague his party. Despite various scandals, he is firmly in
charge, as he showed by engineering a change in party rules to
allow himself to have a third term. Now that he has been re-
elected, Mr Abe should use this unrivalled power to complete
his economic programme. The danger is that he will get
boggeddown in changing Japan’s pacifist constitution instead.
Mr Abe’s longevity has been a blessing for Japan. It has al-
lowed a consistency in policymaking. After a decades-long
swoon,
GDP
is growing, albeit modestly. Inflation, although
low, is at least positive and has been for most of Mr Abe’s ten-
ure. Aswan as this performance sounds, it is the best Japanhas
managed since the 1980s. For that, thank lavish government
spending and bend-over-backwards monetary policy—inte-
gral parts ofMr Abe’s economic platform.
Loose that arrow
Under Mr Abe, Japan has also tried to play a more muscular
role in world affairs. He has beefed up Japan’s “self-defence
forces”, and sent troops to join
UN
peacekeeping missions.
This week, for the first time, his government admitted sending
a submarine into the South China Sea, part of a broader effort
to rebuff Chinese expansionism. And he has passed laws al-
lowing Japan to come to the defence of allies if they are at-
tacked—something previously considered taboo.
Mr Abe wants to amend the constitutional clause that bars
Japan from keeping an army, since that is what the “self-de-
fence forces” patently are. This is a perfectly reasonable idea,
Reforming Japan
A long haul
ShinzoAbe needs to set records forproductivity, not just longevity