Previous Page  21 / 100 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 21 / 100 Next Page
Page Background

The Economist

May 5th 2018

21

1

S

INCE 1972, when the first Strategic Arms

Limitation Talks (

SALT I

) agreement was

signed, there have always been negotiated

constraints on the nuclear arsenals con-

trolled from Washington and Moscow. In

three years, if nothing is done, that half-

century of strategic arms control will be

over. In 2021 the curbs on warhead num-

bers and the protocols for exchanging in-

formation provided by the New

START

(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) of 2011

will lapse unless it is extended. The conse-

quence of the treaty’s demise could be a

dangerous and expensive newarms race.

It far from the only reason for such nuc-

lear worries. Both President Donald

Trump and Vladimir Putin, the president

ofRussia, revel in a formof nuclear bragga-

docio that would have been anathema to

their predecessors. Mr Trump boasts about

the size of his nuclear button and promises

to return America’s nuclear arsenal to “the

top of the pack”. Mr Putinmade the central

set-piece speech of his recent re-election

campaign an extended riff on Dr Strange-

love, gloating over a slew of novel, blood-

curdling weapons, including one that ap-

pears to boast the most powerful warhead

ever created, the better to drench coastal

citieswith irradiated tsunami.

The deal that constrains Iran’s develop-

ment of nuclear weapons is being system-

atically undermined by the Trump admin-

istration. Summitry with North Korea is

more likely to result in grudging recogni-

tion of it as a nuclear-weapon state than to

lead to the dismantling of its arsenal of

missiles. If the talks breakdown the penin-

sula could become even more unstable.

The main bulwark against the spread of

nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Non-Prolif-

eration Treaty, is holding up; but it is in

worse shape than at any time since it en-

tered into force in1970.

You can’t fight in here

It seems a long time since Barack Obama’s

Prague speech, in which he talked about

working towards a world free of nuclear

weapons. In 2010, a year after setting out

that goal, Mr Obama’s administration ne-

gotiated the New

START

agreement with

Dmitry Medvedev, Mr Putin’s more emol-

lient sidekick and placeholder. The treaty

obliged both sides to field no more than

1,550 strategic nuclear warheads with no

more than 800 missiles and bombers to

carry them. Like

SALT I

andmost arms-con-

trol deals since, New

START

contained

detailed verification and monitoring ar-

rangements. These not only ensured that

the two parties were doing what they had

said. They also provided insights into

how they ran their nuclear forces which

improved confidence on both sides.

Since then things have got steadily

worse. To get New

START

ratified by the

Senate, Mr Obama had to show that the

limited number of nukes it allowedwould

be of tip-top quality. Thus he embraced a

sweeping modernisation programme

which calls for the refurbishment of war-

heads and new intercontinental ballistic

missiles (

ICBM

s), submarines and bom-

bers; the Congressional Budget Office ex-

pects it to cost about $1.2trn over the 30

years from 2016. The Russians began their

own ambitious nuclear upgrades, too. Bob

Einhorn, a former arms-control negotiator

now at the Brookings Institution, a think-

tank, fears that “the dynamics of nuclear

modernisation” could lead to new tech-

nologies and therefore new strategic un-

certainties which increase risks even if the

limits ofNew

START

are adhered to.

If all this were going on during a period

when relations between Russia and Amer-

ica allowed for the conduct ofnormal busi-

ness, including follow-on arms-control

agreements, there might not be too much

to worry about, other than the expense.

They aren’t. In 2013 Mr Obama floated the

possibility of the two countries cutting the

number of their deployed nuclear war-

heads bya further third. ButMr Putinmade

it clear, according to Mr Einhorn, that he

had “zero interest” in the proposal. For Mr

Putin, nuclear weapons are not just the ul-

timate guarantor of Russia’s security but a

symbol of national pride that demands re-

spect (and fear) fromadversaries.

Just a few months after Mr Putin’s re-

buff, in January 2014, Rose Gottemoeller,

then under-secretary for arms control at

the State Department and nowdeputy sec-

A farewell to arms control

Old deals to limit nuclearweapons are fraying. Both politics and technological

changemake their refurbishment or replacement unlikely

Briefing

Global security

РЕЛИЗ ПОДГОТОВИЛА ГРУППА "What's News"

VK.COM/WSNWS