The Economist
May 26th 2018
13
1
M
OST American elites be-
lieve that the Trump presi-
dency is hurting their country.
Foreign-policy mandarins are
terrified that security alliances
are being wrecked. Fiscal ex-
pertswarn that borrowing is spi-
ralling out of control. Scientists
deplore the rejection of climate change. And some legal ex-
pertswarn of a looming constitutional crisis.
Amid the tumult there is a striking exception. The people
who run companies have made their calculations about the
Age of Trump. On balance, they like it. Bosses reckon that the
value of tax cuts, deregulation and potential trade concessions
from China outweighs the hazy costs of weaker institutions
and trade wars. And they are willing to play along with Presi-
dent Donald Trump’s home-brewed economic vision, in
which firms are freed from the state and unfair foreign compe-
tition, and profits, investment and, eventually, wages soar.
The financial fireworks on display in the first quarter of this
year suggest that this vision is coming true. The earnings of list-
ed firms rose by 22% compared with a year earlier; investment
was up by 19%. But as our briefing explains, the investment
surge is unlike anybefore—it is skewed towards tech giants, not
firms with factories. When it comes to gauging the full costs of
Mr Trump, America Inc is being short-sighted and sloppy.
The viewfrom the C-suite
Since winning Congress and the White House, the Republi-
cans have sought to unleash the power of business. After the
election Mr Trump held summits with tycoons, televised live
from the boardroom at Trump Tower, and later from his new
HQ
in the Oval Office. Though bosses have tired of this kind of
pantomime, particularly after Mr Trump’s equivocations over
white-supremacist protests in Virginia last summer, they re-
main bullish. A reason is the Republican corporate-tax reform
passed in December, the first on such a scale since 1986. It does
several sensible things, including cutting headline rates to av-
erage European levels. The annual saving of $100bn is worth
6% of pre-tax profits (it accounts for a tenth of the fiscal deficit).
Deregulation is in full swing. This week sawa relaxation of
banking rules (see Finance section). The leaders ofmany agen-
cies have been replacedwithTrumpappointees. The change at
the top, firms say, means officials are beingmore helpful. Asur-
prising number of boardrooms support a muscular stance on
trade with China. If, for argument’s sake, China capitulated to
American demands and imported $200bnmore goods a year,
it could boost the earnings of America Inc by a further 2%. The
benefits for business of Mr Trump are clear, then: less tax and
red tape, potential trade gains and a 6-8% uplift in earnings.
The trouble is that companies are often poor at assessing
nebulous risks, and
CEO
s’ overall view of the environment is
fallible. During the Obama years corporate America was con-
vinced itwas under siegewhen in fact, judged by the numbers,
itwas in a golden era, with average profits 31%above long-term
levels. Now bosses think they have entered a nirvana, when
the reality is that the country’s systemof commerce is lurching
away from rules, openness and multilateral treaties towards
arbitrariness, insularity and transient deals.
As the contours ofthis newworldbecome clearer, sowill its
costs to business in terms of complexity and predictability.
Take complexity first. One of the ironies of the Trump team’s
agenda is that, although they want to get out of businesses’
hair at home, when it comes to trade they want to regulate.
When they tinker with tariffs, large numbers of firms have to
scurry to respondbecause theyhave global supply chains. The
steel duties proposed inMarch cover amere 0.5% ofAmerican
imports, but so far this month 200-odd listed American firms
have discussed the financial impact of tariffs on their calls
with investors. Over time, amesh of distortionswill build up.
Because trade is becoming more regulated, a new surveil-
lance bureaucracy is sprouting. On May 23rd the Department
of Commerce launched a probe of car imports. A bill in Con-
gress envisages vetting all foreign investment into America to
ensure that it does not jeopardise the country’s “technological
and industrial leadership in areas related tonational security”.
American firms have $8trn of capital sunk abroad; foreign
firms have $7trn in America; and there have been 15,000 in-
bound deals since 2008. The cost involved in monitoring all
this activity could ultimately be vast. As America eschews glo-
bal co-operation, its firms will also face more duplicative regu-
lation abroad. Europe has already introduced new regimes
this year for financial instruments and data.
The expense of re-regulating trade could even exceed the
benefits of deregulation at home. That might be tolerable,
were it not for the other big cost of the Trump era: unpredict-
ability. At home the corporate-tax cuts will partly expire after
2022. America’s negotiators are gunning for a five-year sunset
clause in a new
NAFTA
deal, although Canada and Mexico
would prefer something permanent. Bosses hope that the bel-
ligerence on trade is a ploy borrowed from “The Apprentice”,
and that stable agreements will emerge. But imagine that
America stitches up a deal with China and the bilateral trade
deficit then fails to shrink, or Chinese firms cease buying
American high-tech components as they become self-suffi-
cient (see China section), or Mr Trump is mocked for getting a
bad deal. If so, theWhite Housemight rip the agreement up.
The newlaws of the jungle
Another reason for the growingunpredictability isMr Trump’s
urge to show off his power with acts of pure political discre-
tion. He has just asked the postal service to raise delivery
prices for Amazon, his bête noire and theworld’s second-most
valuable listed firm. He could easily strike out in anger at other
Silicon Valley firms—after all, they increasingly control the
flow of political information. He wants the fate of
ZTE
, a Chi-
nese telecoms firm banned in America for sanctions viola-
tions, to turn onhis personal whim. Inevitably, other countries
are playing rougher, too. China’s antitrust police are blocking
Qualcomm’s $52bn takeover of
NXP
, a rival semiconductor
firm, as a bargaining chip. When policy becomes a rolling ne-
gotiation, lobbying explodes. The less predictable business en-
The affair
American executives are betting that the president is good forbusiness. Not in the long run
Leaders