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64 Finance and economics

The Economist

June 9th 2018

I

F YOU are selling shares, they are worth

not what you paid for them, but what

someone elsewill offer. For the Royal Bank

of Scotland (

RBS

), the sum that counts is

£2.71 ($3.62). On June 5th

UK

Government

Investments, which manages the state’s

stakes in companies, said it had placed 7.7%

of

RBS

at that price—10p below the previ-

ous day’s market close—with institutional

buyers, reducing its holding to 62.4%. The

government paid £5.02 per share to rescue

the bank in 2008. So on those 925m shares,

taxpayers have lost £2.1bn.

The state has long looked unlikely to re-

coup its fivers, let alone the £6.25 per share

that the National Audit Office, a public-fi-

nance watchdog, reckoned last year was a

fair benchmark after adding the cost of fi-

nancing the bail-out. (In 2015 it sold 630m

shares, or 5.4%of

RBS

, for £3.30 a pop.) Even

if the stockmarket valued

RBS

as highly as

the book value of its assets—which is true

of few big European banks—the price

would still be only £4, a level it last saw

more than three years ago. Short of cash

and eager to return

RBS

to private hands,

the government may as well take what it

can. It sold its last shares in Lloyds Banking

Group, also bailed out in the crisis, in 2017.

On that rescue it made a small profit.

In the nine years after the crisis,

RBS

’s

losses amounted to a staggering£58.4bn, as

write-downs, fines and restructuring costs

piled up. After the hubristic purchase in

2007 of

ABNAMRO

, a Dutch lender, which

led to its undoing,

RBS

was briefly the

world’s biggest bank, with assets of over

£2trn. Now it is about a third of that size

and ranks only tenth even in Europe. Its in-

vestment bank, which brought in more

than a third of operating profit before the

crisis, accounted for under a tenth of a far

smaller sum in the first quarter of 2018.

Yet

RBS

is still one of Britain’s biggest

banks—and underneath it all, these days is

in fair shape. In the first quarter its return

on equity was 9.3%, a bit short of the 10%

that analysts still regard as par but decent

by European standards. Its ratio of equity

to risk-weighted assets, a key measure of

capital strength, is a robust 16.4%. Last year

it made its first net profit since its fall.

The sale is another step in the bank’s

slow emergence from the shadow of the

crisis. Only last month did

RBS

say that it

had agreed inprinciplewithAmerica’sDe-

partment of Justice to settle, for $4.9bn in

cash, charges that it had mis-sold residen-

tial mortgage-backed securities between

2005 and 2007. It might have been worse:

$3.5bn was covered by provisions

RBS

had

already made. The settlement cleared the

way for thisweek’s share sale.

Another legacy of the past is still to be

cleared up. Last year, as part of the price of

the bail-out, the government and the Euro-

pean Commission agreed on a scheme un-

der which

RBS

will give up about 3% of the

British market for small businesses, which

it leads. The bank is putting up £425m to

build up smaller banks’ capabilities, plus

£350m for incentives to customers to

switch banks. The bosses of the body that

will divide the cash were appointed only

inMay. Financial crises cast long shadows.

RBS

isn’t in the sunshine yet.

7

Royal Bank of Scotland

Cut your losses

Britain’s government resumes sales of

shares in the nationalised lender

B

UYINGand selling shares in India is not

for the faint of heart. Its own central-

bank governor reckons equity capital is

taxed up to five times. Never fear. There is a

well-established alternative. Investors can

just as easily buy financial instruments

that track share prices but are not them-

selves shares. Such “derivatives” are used

across the world to mirror markets in

everything from platinum to pork bellies.

But theyalso raise awkwardquestions: can

the exchange that generates prices by

matching buyers and sellers stop a rival us-

ing the data to create its own derivatives?

A quarrel between the Singapore Ex-

change (

SGX

) and the National Stock Ex-

change (

NSE

) inMumbai touches that very

issue. Since 2000 global investors wanting

exposure to Indian shares but not Indian

red tape and tax have gone via

SGX

. Under

a licence from

NSE

, punters could trade a

derivative linked to the Nifty 50, an index

which is to India what the

FTSE

100 is to

Britain or the

S&P

500 is to America.

Because the contract paid out the value

of the Nifty on a given date, arbitraging al-

gorithms run by outside traders ensured

the derivative tracked the index closely:

buying the Nifty in Singapore or Mumbai

amounted to much the same thing. But in

February

NSE

ended the arrangement. It

now thinks all trading can happen in India

thanks to new regulatory arrangements

that make it just as amenable to global cap-

ital as Singapore.

That claim is doubtful. In any event,

SGX

is clearly not keen to find out. Instead

of licensing the Nifty brand and paying the

NSE

for a steady flow of data, as hitherto,

SGX

said itwould switch towhat is in effect

a home-brewed duplicate. Whereas the

“real” Nifty is designed to match the price

of an underlying basket of 50 shares, the

newproduct is designed tomatch the price

oftheNiftyderivative instead. It is, in other

words, the derivative of a derivative.

That is just a fancy way of breaching

copyright, the

NSE

argues. It owns theNifty

trademark and

SGX

’s product is but a thin-

ly veiled clone of its own.

SGX

does indeed

seemto bemakingno effort to differentiate

itself. The marketing literature for its new

derivative says it aims to track 50 shares

that together represent 65% of the Indian

market, just like the Nifty. The only differ-

ence is that it does not mention it by name.

Lawyers on both sides are brushing up

on intellectual-property law. An arbitrator

in Mumbai is due to make a ruling by June

16th, though appeals are expected.

SGX

has

some precedents on its side. In 2005 a New

York judge ruled that

ICE

, a commodity ex-

change, had broken no law when it lifted

publicly available energy prices from

NY-

MEX

, a rival, to fuel its own derivatives

contracts. “Settlement prices are not copy-

rightable because they are facts, and not

original, creativeworks,” he said.

Nobody is arguingagainst

SGX

’s right to

set upaderivative on individual shares list-

ed inMumbai; it recently started doing just

that. But tracking the whole Nifty requires

using one monthly value, calculated by

NSE

, to “settle” the derivative. Arguably

this calculation is closer to an art than pub-

lishing a single fact. American courts have

found firms that provide such indices (for

example, on which stocks are included)

may indeed limit their outside use.

Though the row hurts both sides, no

deal seems in sight.

MSCI

, which crafts a

popular emerging-markets index that

guides the investment of trillions world-

wide, haswarned that trying to throttle the

dissemination of price data would make it

harder for money to flow into India. It has

argued that stockmarkets are natural mo-

nopolies that should in effect be com-

pelled to sell their prices towhoeverwants

them. Informationwants to be free, but try

telling that to those compiling the data.

7

Stock exchanges

Whose price is it

anyway?

MUMBAI

India’s and Singapore’s bourses tussle

overwho ownsmarket data