The Economist
June 9th 2018
Asia 23
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tees that the Kim regime will be safe from
American attack if it agrees to disarm.
The problem is that all this has been
tried before. The two Koreas first forswore
nuclear weapons in a solemn agreement
in 1992, shortly after America removed tac-
tical nuclear weapons from its bases in
South Korea. But in 1994 the ageing “Great
Leader”, Kim Il Sung, kicked out interna-
tional inspectors and threatened to divert
plutonium from a nuclear reactor into half
a dozen primitive bombs. Under an
“Agreed Framework” in late 1994 the North
promised to abandon illicit work on pluto-
niumweapons, in return forAmerican aid,
oil and civilian nuclear reactors. In1999 the
North was bribed with sanctions relief to
give up missile testing, and in 2000 a sum-
mit between leaders of the two Koreas
prompted talk of a visit by President Bill
Clinton (in the end, he only made the trip
after leaving office). By 2002 North Korea
revealed it had a secret uranium weapons
programme and expelled international in-
spectors, leading to a multilateral peace
drive called the “six-party talks”. Those
lasted until a nuclear test in 2006. The
North tested five further nuclear devices
between 2009 and 2017. North Korea also
defied the
UN
Security Council to test bal-
listic missiles of increasing range, culmi-
nating last year in several tests of devices
capable of hitting the Americanmainland.
Christopher Hill, a former American
diplomat, recalls stirring language about
working towards a “permanent peace re-
gime on the Korean Peninsula” in an agree-
ment signed by America, China, Japan,
North Korea, Russia and South Korea in
2005, as part of the six-party talks. That
agreement also included North Korean
promises to give up nuclearweapons, sub-
mit to international inspections, and rejoin
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (
NPT
)
fromwhich it had earlier stalked.
Back then, America offered explicit se-
curity guarantees that it had no intention
to attackor invade North Koreawith either
nuclear or conventional weapons and
guaranteed that it had no nuclearweapons
deployed in South Korea. Even the idea of
exchanging interests sections has been
tried, at China’s urging, Mr Hill recalls. He
worked mightily to convince a sceptical
Bush administration to agree to the idea,
then took it to the North in 2007. “They re-
jected it on the spot,” the former ambassa-
dor sighs. “TheNorthKoreans tend towant
something until they don’t want it.”
Justmaybe
There are reasons to imagine, however,
that theNorthmaybemore eager for a deal
this time than it has been in the past.
Thoughnuclearweapons remain the pillar
of Mr Kim’s regime and are popular with
ordinary North Koreans, the elites have
also become attached to the minor eco-
nomic boom over which Mr Kim has pre-
sided, says Andrei Lankov of Kookmin
University in Seoul. Mr Kim has even
promised to embrace growth aswell as de-
fence, after years of putting weapons-
building first.
Mr Kim has gone further than his fore-
bears in giving priority to economic devel-
opment, tolerating a big, semi-legal “grey
market” and allowing the running of de
facto private enterprises within state-
owned firms. He has even encouraged
private investment by his subjects. One
government regulation calls for the “utili-
sation and mobilisation of the unused
funds ofresidents”. SinceMrKimtookover
in 2011, the economy has grown in the low
single digits every year bar one, according
to statistics compiled by South Korea’s cen-
tral bank. Although those numbers are un-
reliable, they mark a striking departure
from the economic collapse and wide-
spread famine over which Mr Kim’s father
presided. North Korean officials have told
foreign visitors that Mr Kim hopes to emu-
late Vietnam, which has grown rapidly
after making peace with America, in part
to hedge against a risingChina.
At a minimum, Mr Kim will be keen to
secure some easing of sanctions. Imports
of solar panels from China, which had
been rising rapidly until last year as well-
to-do residents of Pyongyang tried to be-
come independent of the unreliable pow-
er supply, fell to zero in March for the first
time in eight years, according to Chinese
customs statistics analysed by
NK
News.
Fuel prices spiked in earlyApril, and
NGO
s
have begun to notice shortages of fertiliser
in the countryside. None of this will have
improved the mood of North Korea’s
quasi-capitalists. “These people like mak-
ingmoney, and if they stopmakingmoney
or suffer discomfort, that will be a problem
for the leadership,” saysMr Lankov.
What ismore, Mr Kimmay see a chance
of a breakthrough. North Korea has made
great efforts to understand American poli-
tics in the Trump era. North Korean offi-
cials have been asking foreign contacts
about such arcana as the implications of
the recent Republican loss of a Senate seat
in Alabama. According to the Chinese aca-
demic, the regime has decided that Mr
Trump has no firm ideology and is a deal-
maker unlike any president they have en-
countered. Against that, his recent pull-out
of the Iran nuclear deal makes him look
like a deal-breaker. On balance, he says, Mr
Kim’s side senses opportunitiesworth test-
ing. The current rivalry between America
and China provides another opportunity,
to play themoffagainst each other.
Mr Trump, meanwhile, seems deter-
mined to be emollient. Despite declaring
in lateMay that he was calling off the sum-
mit because of the North’s “open hostil-
ity”, Mr Trumpwarmly received one ofMr
Kim’s henchmen at theWhiteHouse, bear-
ing an absurdly large letter from his boss.
Soon afterwards, Mr Trump reinstated the
meeting, despite the lack of any clear pub-
lic commitments from the North on disar-
mament, for example. (The contents of the
giant letter have not been disclosed.) John
Bolton, Mr Trump’s national security ad-
viser, has been kept in the background,
after he infuriated the North by citing Lib-
ya’s complete dismantling of its nuclear
programme as a model, even though the
Libyan leader who agreed to this, Muam-
marQaddafi, ended up dead in a ditch.
Most importantly, Mr Trump seems to
North Korea’s nuclear path
Kim Jong Il
Kim Jong Un
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
NK supreme
leaders
and
US presidents
Donald
Trump
Bill Clinton
Kim Il
Sung
1993 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Threatens to
leave Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT),
then relents
UN inspectors say
North Korea is
hiding evidence of
nuclear fuel for
bombmaking
Agrees to
freeze testing
on long-
range missiles
First summit
between
North and
South since
end of
Korean War
Signs “agreed framework”
with US to freeze and
dismantle nuclear
programme in exchange
for nuclear reactors,
aid and easing of
sanctions
Carries out 1st
underground
nuclear test
3rd nuclear test
Restarts
nuclear reactor
4th and 5th
nuclear tests
6th nuclear test
Planned summit with Mr Trump in Singapore
Partially demolishes
underground nuclear test site
Two summits between leaders of North
and South in demilitarised zone
Further UN sanctions
UN agrees on
new sanctions
Agrees to
return to
NPT. One
day later,
demands
reactor
from US
Expels UN
inspectors;
pulls out of
talks and
restarts
nuclear
facilities
2nd nuclear
test
Sinks
South
Korean
warship
Six-party talks with
China, Russia, US, Japan
and South Korea
Series of US-North
Korean talks
Expels UN
inspectors
from nuclear
facilities
Withdraws from NPT
Declares
reactivation of
nuclear facilities
Says it will disable
nuclear facilities.
US agrees to
unfreeze assets
and provide aid
Second summit
with South Korea
Announces it
has nuclear
weapons
Sources: CSIS;
The Economist
Missile tests