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The Economist

June 9th 2018

11

P

ICTURE this: next week in

Singapore President Donald

Trump and Kim Jong Un crown

their summit with a pledge to

rid the Korean peninsula of nuc-

lear weapons. A few days later

America and China step back

from a trade war, promising to

settle their differences. And in the summer, as sanctions bite,

the streets of Tehran rise up to cast off the Iranian regime.

These gains would be striking from any American presi-

dent. From a man who exults in breaking foreign-policy ta-

boos, theywould be truly remarkable. But are they likely? And

when Mr Trump seeks to bring them about with a wrecking

ball aimed at allies and global institutions, what is the balance

of costs and benefits to America and theworld?

Don’t you ever say I justwalked away

You may wonder howMr Trump’s narcissism and lack of de-

tailed understanding could ever transformAmerica’s standing

for the better. Yet his impulses matter, if only because he offers

a new approach to old problems. Like Barack Obama, Mr

Trump inherited a country tired of being the world’s police-

man, frustratedby jihadists and rogue states like Iran, andwor-

riedby the growingchallenge fromChina. Grindingwars inAf-

ghanistan and Iraq, and the financial crisis of 2008, only

deepened a sense that the system of institutions, treaties, alli-

ances and classically liberal values put together after 1945 was

no longer benefiting ordinaryAmericans.

Mr Obama’s solution was to call on like-minded democra-

cies tohelp repair and extend thisworldorder. Hence the Irani-

an nuclear deal, choreographed with Europe, Russia and Chi-

na, which bound Iran into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty. And hence the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which sought

to unite America’s Asian allies around new trading rules that

would one day channel Chinese ambitions.

Mr Trump has other ideas. He launched air strikes on Syria

after it used nerve gas in the name of upholding international

norms—and thus looked better than Mr Obama, who didn’t.

Otherwise he treats every relationship as a set of competitive

transactions. When America submits to diplomatic pieties,

conventions or the sensitivities of its allies, he believes, it is ne-

gotiatingwith one hand tied behind its back.

If any country can bully the world, America can. Its total

military, diplomatic, scientific, cultural and economic power is

still unmatched. Obviously, that power is there tobe exploited,

which is why every president, including Mr Obama, has used

it to get his way abroad even if that involves threats, intimida-

tion and, occasionally, deception. But it is hard to think of a

presidentwho bullies as gleefully asMr Trump. No othermod-

ern president has routinely treated America’s partners so

shoddily or eschewed the idea of leading through alliances.

None has so conspicuously failed to clothe the application of

coercive power in the claim to be acting for the global good.

In the short term some of Mr Trump’s aims may yet suc-

ceed. Iran’s politics are unpredictable and the economy is

weak. Mr Kim probablywants a deal of some sort, though not

full disarmament (see Asia section). On trade, China would

surely prefer accommodation to confrontation.

Yet in the long run his approach will not work. He starts

from false premises. He is wrong to think that every winner

creates a loser or that a trade deficit signifies a “bad deal”. He is

wrong, too, to think that America loses by taking on the costs

of global leadership and submitting itself to rules. On the con-

trary, rules help deter aggressors, shape countries’ behaviour,

safeguard American interests and create a mechanism to help

solve problems from trade to climate change.

RAND

, a non-

partisan think-tank, has spent two years assessing the costs

and benefits of the postwar order for America. It powerfully

endorses the vision that Mr Trump sneers at—indeed, it con-

cludes, this order is vital for America’s security.

Mr Trump’s antics would matter less if they left the world

order unscathed (see Briefing). But four yearswill spread anar-

chy and hostility. The trading systemwill be unable to enforce

old rules or forge new ones. Short of a war with, say, Russia,

America’s allies will be less inclined to follow its lead. In Eu-

rope more voices may complain that sanctions against Russia

are harmful. In Asia countries may hedge against America’s

unreliability by cosying up to China or by arming themselves,

accelerating a destabilising arms race. Countries everywhere

will be freer to act with impunity. These changes will be hard

to reverse. Sooner or later, Americawill bear some of the costs.

Worst of all, Mr Trump’s impulses mean that China’s rise is

more likely to end in confrontation. He is right to detect a surge

in Chinese ambitions after the financial crisis and the arrival

of Xi Jinping in 2012. That justifies toughness. But Mr Trump’s

dark, zero-sum outlook is destined to lead to antagonism and

rivalry, because it refuses to see that China’s rise could benefit

America or to follow the logic that China might be content to

livewithin a systemof rules that it has helped devise.

I just closedmy eyes and swung

If the “master negotiator” so underestimates what he is giving

up, how can he strike a good bargain for his people? He values

neither the world trading system nor allies, so he may be will-

ing to wreck it for the empty promise of smaller bilateral defi-

cits. That could lead to retaliation (see next leader). Iran could

resume nuclear work, as ruling clerics ape North Korea’s strat-

egy of arming themselves before talking. Mr Trump may give

Mr Kim the prize of a summit and an easing of sanctions in ex-

change for a curb on North Korea’s long-range ballistic mis-

siles. Thatwould protect America (and be better thanwar), but

it would leave Asian allies vulnerable to the North’s nukes.

America First today; in the long run America Alone.

America’s unique willingness to lead by fusing power and

legitimacy saw off the Soviet Union and carried it to hegemo-

ny. Theworldorder it engineered is the vehicle for that philoso-

phy. But Mr Trump prefers to fall back on the old idea that

might is right. His impulses may begin to impose a new geo-

politics, but they will not serve America or the world for long.

Remember thewords ofHenry Kissinger: order cannot simply

be ordained; to be enduring, it must be accepted as just.

7

Demolition man

Even ifDonald Trump strikes a dealwithNorthKorea, his foreign policywill harmAmerica and theworld

Leaders